The development of intelligence and internal security institutions in Portugal and Brazil were directly influenced by the ways in which both countries transitioned to democracy and by the nature of their political regimes prior to the mid-1970s. This article compares these processes, highlighting how Brazilian and Portuguese intelligence and public security institutions and bodies developed over the course of the 20th century, and in particular following democratization of their political regimes. Our analysis examines the main factors explaining the arrangements adopted, and the obstacles and dilemmas encountered in the institutionalization of these services and of the new democratic regimes. The results suggest that the type of transition to democracy is the main factor explaining differences between the two cases. However, more comparative research is needed to deepen empirical and theoretical understandings and to allow for greater generalization about the relationship between changes in political regimes and reforms of coercive and intelligence institutions. (2019) 13 (2) e0006 -2/29 his article offers a comparative analysis of the development of intelligence and public security institutions in Portugal and Brazil, from the start of their processes of democratization in the mid-1970s 1 . Our interest in this comparison is based on a similarity that is fundamental to the analysis: regime transitions in both countries are part of three dozen similar cases that were part of the "third wave of democratizations" (HUNTINGTON, 1993). The fact that they initiated regime changes at the same historical moment facilitates comparisons of the ways intelligence and internal security organs developed following democratization. The comparison also makes it possible to examine hypotheses that relate the type of the previous regime and the mode of transition as variables that account for obstacles encountered in the consolidation of new democratic regimes, and in particular dilemmas relating to the institutionalization of intelligence and public security services under conditions of legitimacy and democratic control. We share the view, expressed by several researchers (ANTUNES, 2002; institutionalized, legitimate and effective intelligence and internal security services are essential if democratic regimes are to fulfil their functions of maintaining internal order, sovereignty and effectiveness in the formulation of public security policies. The crucial problem surrounding this question is the tension, inherent to all democratic regimes, between the coercive functions of public security organs and the civil liberties and rights of citizens, and between the needs of intelligence services for secrecy and the imperative for democratic controls of their activities (CEPIK, 2005, pp. 68-69). These dilemmas are particularly important for countries emerging from long periods of dictatorship, such as Portugal and Brazil.
operated during dictatorships (ANDREGG and GILL, 2014) , which were closely linked to the imperatives of political repression and the contingencies of Cold War.
By contrast, intelligence services in more established democracies typically developed primarily under the strong influence of diplomacy and war . As such, the amalgamation between public security and national security, as well as between internal and external enemies, permeated the initial steps taken towards institutionalizing intelligence services and maintaining internal order in most newly democratized countries, often with deleterious effects on civil liberties.
One of the most influential theories of path dependency in the literature on transitions to democracy (O'DONNELL, 1988) argues that the more gradual and controlled these processes were, the greater the difficulties of consolidating democracy, as a result of 'authoritarian residue' under new regimes. For Share and Mainwaring (1986) , while the way in which democracy is initially established does not fully determine its future development, the initial conditions of the new regime do establish the rules of the game, modes of interaction and the limits imposed on actors and political change. Path dependency approaches have also been used, explicitly or implicitly, in valuable comparative studies looking specifically at the development of intelligence and public security services after the 'third wave' of democratization (BRANDÃO, 2010; CEPIK, 2005; MENDONÇA, 2010; NUMERIANO, 2010; PINTO, 2010) . However, as we will argue here, it remains difficult to assess the real influence of the various explanatory variables included within such models.
The main similarities between the Portuguese and Brazilian cases are that intelligence and public security organizations had focused primarily on repressing domestic political opposition, thus making their legitimization under new democratic regimes especially problematic. However, there are a greater number of divergences between the two countries. In Portugal, during the Salazar period, there were colonial wars and a revolution, the Revolução dos Cravos (Carnation Revolution), in 1974, which produced a rupture between the old and the new regimes. This was followed by decolonization and the country's accession to the European Union after 1986. This process of regional integration was followed by reforms to internal security organizations that removed military oversight and, subsequently, were incorporated into political responses to terrorist attacks carried out in Europe in the years following the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States. These reforms Democratization and Intelligence and Internal Security Agencies: a Comparative Analysis of the Cases of Brazil and Portugal (1974-2014) (2019) 13 (2) e0006 -4/29 aimed to promote greater interstate cooperation for regional security. Therefore, the institutionalization of the Portuguese intelligence services was firmly embedded in the rules of the democratic regime, subordinated to civilian coordination and parliamentary control.
By contrast, Brazil underwent a negotiated transition under the control of authoritarian leaders, which resulted in a democratic regime with a high degree of political continuity (ANDREGG and GILL, 2014) , significant military prerogatives and weak civilian (CEPIK and AMBROS, 2014) and legislative control (MATEI and BRUNEAU, 2011) of intelligence and security organizations. These characteristics, associated with incipient state capacity to guarantee citizens' rights, the stigma of political policing earned by the intelligence services in the past, the difficulty of transferring powers from the military to civilians, and a lack of clarity about intelligence activities made the legitimization and institutionalization of the country's intelligence and security systems under the new democratic regime extremely difficult, in spite of important reforms that have been carried out in recent years (BRUNEAU, 2010, BRUNEAU and DOMBROSKI, 2006; CEPIK and AMBROS, 2014; MATEI and BRUNEAU, 2011; MENDONÇA, 2010) . Moreover, according to Bruneau (2015) , the absence of external threats, combined with low state capacity, constituted the main factors explaining the low level of effectiveness of the Brazilian intelligence services.
We therefore seek to answer two fundamental questions: 01. How are these intelligence and internal security systems constituted and how do they operate? 02.
What degree of democratic political control is exercised over intelligence and security organizations?
Our main hypothesis is that the core explanatory factors for the configuration and recent evolution of intelligence and security systems in the two countries are: 01. the characteristics of the dictatorship; 02. the mode of political transition;
03. the changes occurring during the consolidation of democracy; 04. the initial institutional design of these bodies; 05. the interaction between the various actors involved, and their strategic choices; and 06. civil-military relations. These variables have different weights and differ in the configuration of the current intelligence services, according to the political history of each country, as we will argue throughout the article. In order to identify these variables, we trace the processes that mark the transitions to democracy in both cases and the trajectories of institutional changes (AMORIM NETO and RODRIGUEZ, 2016; COLLIER, 2011) .
This work deals mainly with national-level external intelligence and internal security services (increasingly focused on police and law enforcement activities,
'new threats' and counter-terrorism), and, to a lesser extent, military intelligence, regional and international cooperation structures, and state public security departments which command their own judicial and military police, though the state level will not be prioritized in the analysis. Military defence policies will only be addressed where they focus on internal security. The sources of data used in the research come from official documents, press coverage and the academic literature.
The article is structured in two main parts: the first, divided into two sections, maps processes of the development of intelligence and internal security organizations, from their origins to their consolidation under Portugal's and Brazil's respective dictatorships. The second part, also with two sections, addresses current configurations of intelligence systems and organizations that developed during the process of democratization in both countries, up to the end of the 2000s. Finally, we offer some final considerations on the themes discussed, from a comparative perspective.
The evolution of the intelligence and security services in Portugal
The first organizations fitting the conceptual definition of these services were created during the period of the Estado Novo Salazarista. Brazil and Portugal (1974-2014) (2019) 13 (2) e0006 -6/29
The political police in Portugal during Salazarism
The beginning of the Salazar period saw the 'production' of the state's repressive apparatus, through its reorganization and expansion (CEREZALES, 2008 (CEREZALES, , 2010 During the Colonial War (1960) (1961) (1962) , sub-delegations and border and surveillance posts were created in Angola and Mozambique, placing the PIDE "in relation to overseas territories, as the armed forces were" (PIMENTEL, 2009, p. 40) .
In 1962, the number of PIDE employees overseas exceeded the number on the Mainland and Islands. Furthermore, Pimentel (2009) and Numeriano (2010) emphasize the PIDE's role in monitoring left-and right-leaning members of the military, within the regime. The institution's activities were wide-ranging, extending reached all spheres of power. Therefore, despite its civilian activity in the metropole, the PIDE at this stage was also active alongside the armed forces overseas. According to Cerezales (2008) and Pimentel (2009) , the PIDE did not become militarized, as the Republican National Guard (GNR) and the Public Security Police (PSP) had in its actions in the Portuguese colonies. However, as Numeriano (2010) (PINTO, 2006) .
The 25th of April 1974 and the transition to democracy in Portugal
The military coup of April 25, 1974 (hereafter the Carnation Revolution), which ended the Salazar regime, initiated a troubled period of transition to democracy, which only became institutionalized with the constitutional revision of 1982. According to Lobo, Magalhães and Pinto (2009) , the context that preceded the Carnation Revolution can be characterized by a lack of international support for the regime in the context of the Cold War, by an atmosphere of crisis in the state and by the intensification of decolonization struggles in Portugal's African colonies. The Portuguese case stands out for the singular role of the military, whose coup led the country towards democracy and decolonization. 
Political liberalization and divisions within the 'security community'
It is important to emphasize a number of aspects that distinguish Brazil's dictatorship from similar regimes in the region. It lasted the longest, was the most successful economically and was less repressive than its counterparts. The Brazilian democratization process is also distinguished by the fact that it developed through negotiations that remained under the strong control of authoritarian leaders. With regard to the intelligence services, the SNI continued to operate during José Sarney's government, a situation that was unprecedented during the 'third wave of democratizations'. The SNI continued to focus on opposition groups, producing monthly reports on the country's internal security and monitoring strikes which were multiplying during the period (CEPIK and ANTUNES, 2003) . This situation ensured that a military ethos -which continues even today -remained hegemonic within the civil intelligence activities, maintaining practices and legacies that had been instituted during the dictatorship (NUMERIANO, 2010).
The current configuration of Portugal's intelligence system
The current configuration of the Sistema de Informações da República Portuguesa (Information System of the Portuguese Republic, SIRP) is consistent the fourth and fifth periods of institutional evolution of these services as identified by These changes within the SSI are related to regional integration and the new demands of regional security organization and cooperation within the European Union. The fight against terrorism is central in this respect, since police cooperation between the Portuguese security forces and the European Police Service (EUROPOL), which was established in 2010, plays a key role in regional security. In Finally, it is worth highlighting that the reforms and changes to Portugal's internal security respond to various issues and embody an adaptation to the post-11 September context of strengthening regional integration. It should also be noted that military control has weakened as democratic consolidation has advanced. The institutionalization of these services and their legitimacy among the population have also grown, with the creation of more effective control structures to regulate the security and intelligence forces. As we shall see below, the structure and functioning of the current Brazilian intelligence system is still a long way off from the level of democratic institutionalization achieved in Portugal.
The trajectory of Brazil's intelligence system after democratization
The This is the period in which the agencies of the Brazilian 'intelligence community' begin to substitute the term 'information', used during the dictatorship, for 'intelligence', possibly as a way removing the stigma of the past, as well as modernizing the sector's nomenclature (ANTUNES, 2002) . The air force was the first to begin a reorganization process, creating its Secretaria de Inteligência weakened after its involvement in a political scandal, Operation Satiagraha in 2008, which involved the illegal use of its agents in actions by the Federal Police. Mendonça (2010) , like Priscila Brandão (ANTUNES, 2002; BRANDÃO, 2010) , uses the notion of path-dependency (COLLIER and COLLIER, 1991) -though, in his case, only at the organizational and institutional level -to demonstrate how the 'Satiagraha case' was a critical moment for the ABIN/SISBIN. The researcher, who is also an ABIN intelligence officer, draws on Wolfgang Krieger's (2009) argument that the most powerful form of control of intelligence activities is legislative control and its individual commissions. However, according to the author, the legislature is generally ineffective and even negligent, until a political scandal or a serious 'intelligence' failure erupts. At that moment, the legislature reacts, either by establishing commissions of inquiry or by forming commissions for reforming of the intelligence system, as happened after the both Satiagraha case in Brazil and the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States, cases that Mendonça (2010) compares in his work.
The main problem with the institutionalization of civilian intelligence is not, therefore, the stigma that ABIN faces due to its being the heir of SNI (ANTUNES, 2002; BRANDÃO, 2010) or its internal militarization -which, according to Mendonça (2010) , is declining -but rather that it is being prevented from becoming the leading civilian institution for the coordination of state intelligence. In this regard, the military seeks to expand its 'territory' and in turn diplomats choose to align themselves with either the military or ABIN agents, at their own discretion.
Besides the problems surrounding the institutionalization of the SISBIN under civilian and democratic control, and continuing military prerogatives resulting from the transition agreement, the ineffectiveness of the democratic state for a large part of the population, evidenced by widespread violence and the failure of public security, have become, in our view, the most important factor impeding the deepening of the democracy in Brazil. Such ineffectiveness and violence primarily affect the poorest. State agencies, however, are reluctant to respond equitably and recognize the rights of the poorest and social minorities. This is particularly the case for public security agencies, who persist in the use of arbitrary and violent methods against these sectors of the population.
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A sign of the times, in 2010, was when the army and navy, along with the Rio de Janeiro state police and the Federal Police, participated in a major joint police operation in a favela in Rio de Janeiro, showing that militarization is also affecting public security (PASSOS, 2018) . This phenomenon was reinforced by the growth of Garantia da Lei e da Ordem (Law and Order Guarantee, GLO) operations by the military and its central role in coordinating the security of the 2014 Football World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games.
In the Table 01 below we synthesize the main explanatory variables revealed in our process mapping of the two cases, allowing for both their comparison and differentiation. In particular, it should be noted that both the type of regime change and the duration of the transition affect the relationship between the old and new institutions and affect the form of interaction between the sectors and civilmilitary relations. 
Final considerations
The main objective of the study has been to compare the institutional arrangements of the intelligence and internal security services in Portugal and Brazil, allowing a better understanding of the development of these institutions and their current challenges, based on democratization processes in both countries. In contrast to the Brazil, Portugal has become a kind of exemplary control case for the democratization of intelligence services and the consolidation of democracy in recent years (NUMERIANO, 2010) . As our mapping of these processes shows, path dependency is very evident and the key explanatory variable accounting for the democratic institutionalization of these organizations is the type of Brazil and Portugal (1974-2014) (2019) 13 (2) e0006 -24/29 over these organizations following democratization. For those who, like Zaverucha (2000, 2005) and Numeriano (2010) , focus their analysis on civil-military relations, the most important factor is the demilitarization of the external and internal intelligence agencies. They argue this is a necessary condition for the consolidation of the democratic regimes, something they argue has not yet been achieved in Brazil. Cepik (2005 Cepik ( , 2009 ), Brandão (2010) and Mendonça (2010) , meanwhile, are more attentive to institutional factors, interests and interaction among the main actors involved. However, there are nuances between their interpretations. Priscila Brandão (2010) attributes the constraints to the institutionalization of the civilian intelligence sector in Brazil to the legacy of the transition and choices made by key actors during 'critical moments' of these processes. In this interpretation, also based on a path-dependency model, the type of the previous regime has less explanatory value than the type of transition, a process that left authoritarian legacies (militarization, stigma of intelligence agencies, political and social neglect of the sector, etc) that in her view still constrain the legitimate institutionalization of intelligence services and civilian political dominance over the military. According to Brandão (2010) , the current structure of the intelligence services still favours military over civilian interests. She concludes that the form of transition influences the pattern of civil-military relations under the new democratic regime more than the reform of intelligence institutions. Thus, for Brandão (2010) , civilian and legislative interests become "a more relevant variable than institutional constraints in the process of refounding national civilian intelligence agencies in Brazil, Chile and
Argentina" (BRANDÃO, 2010, p. 259).
Cepik's argument (2005) is different from those that propose strong links between the type of transition and its effects on the institutionalization of intelligence and public security services, although he recognizes the repercussions of those processes in the current constraints faced by the sector. Cepik (2005) , in a paper on Brazilian intelligence agencies, based on a model developed by Peter Gill still has a long way to go with regard to the armed forces and the police" (CEPIK, 2005, p. 96). Mendonça (2010) , meanwhile, is the only author who does not include processes of democratization as a variable influencing the current configuration of intelligence agencies. The current situation of the sector, according to the author, is characterized by a "hypertrophy of military intelligence" (MENDONÇA, 2010, p. 77) and by a deep inter-agency conflict between the military, diplomats and civilians in the ABIN, in which the first two actors seek to prevent the latter agency from effectively coordinating the SISBIN. The Brazilian intelligence system has evolved through advances and retreats in civilian coordination and democratic control, and is now at another critical moment in its institutionalization. With regard to path dependency models based on democratization processes, we can say that in the case of negotiated and gradual transitions like the Brazilian one, it becomes very difficult to identify the importance of variables relating to the type of previous regime, transition and dynamics of democratic consolidation, given the high degree of political and institutional continuity between these phases. There is a need for more empirical and comparative studies to further develop theoretical approaches to the subject.
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